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 The Barenblatt Decision
 of the Supreme Court
 and the Academic Profession
 By RALPH F. FUCHS
 Indiana University
 A student or faculty member of a college or university, unless he
 invokes the privilege against self-incrimination, may be required by a
 legislative investigating committee to answer questions relating to his
 Communist Party membership and knowledge of Party activities, if
 the committee possesses previous indication of his possible membership.
 Such is the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
 recent Barenblatt case,1 sustaining a conviction for contempt of Congress
 on account of Barenblatt's refusal on First Amendment grounds to
 answer certain questions of a subcommittee of the House Un-American
 Activities Committee in 1954.
 Barenblatt was a graduate student and teaching fellow at the
 University of Michigan during the period 1947-50, to which the ques-
 tions related,2 and the Committee, besides inquiring about Communist
 Party membership, asked Barenblatt whether he had been a member
 of the Haldane Club, an allegedly Communist Party offshoot in the
 University. Previous testimony before the subcommittee had named
 him as a member of the Party and of the Club.
 The American Association of University Professors had filed a
 brief amicus curiae in the case, requesting the Court to decide that
 compulsion to answer the questions, under the circumstances of the
 case, was either unauthorized or unconstitutional. The Association's
 brief challenged the existence of authorization by the House of Repre-
 sentatives of the Un-American Activities Committee's investigation
 into education, as well as the Committee's authority to put the specific
 x360\J. S. 109 (June 8, 1959).
 •Barenblatt was an instructor at Vassar College at the time he was summoned
 to appear before the subcommittee, but this fact was not significant in relation to
 the case, except as it linked his graduate training to membership in the academic
 profession.
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 questions asked of Barenblatt. The Court sustained the Committee on
 both points. The brief further argued that such an investigation, if
 authorized by Congress without more justification than appeared in the
 case, would violate the First Amendment freedoms of speech and as-
 sembly, or association, in colleges and universities. This contention
 was based on the need for academic institutions to have independence
 from external pressures, the minor extent of the actual threat from
 Communism in higher education in this country, and the existing aca-
 demic safeguards against improper activities in colleges and universities.
 Like the prior contentions, this one was unsuccessful.
 It is important both to grasp the narrowness of the constitutional
 point actually decided by the Court and to gauge the possible significance
 of the decision on this point in relation to wider issues. The decision
 was by a 5-4 majority. The opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan for the
 Court and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black articulate the
 philosophies underlying their opposite conclusions. Chief Justice
 Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the Black opinion, and
 Mr. Justice Brennan, in a brief separate opinion, expressed his partial
 agreement with it and his support of the result it urged.
 In justifying the Court's decision, the majority opinion relies
 heavily on prior judicial and legislative recognition of the purpose of
 the Communist Party to secure the ultimate overthrow of the govern-
 ment by force and violence. It recognizes the power of the legislature
 to enact laws to deal with this threat, and therefore to conduct inquiries
 relevant to such legislation. The case does not involve and the opinion
 does not pass upon the validity of criminal statutes or other govern-
 mental measures to combat subversive activities.3 The issue decided
 relates to the power of investigation to determine the need for legislation.
 The opinion points out that the investigation here was not of a "dragnet"
 variety, calling persons before the Committee indiscriminately as wit-
 nesses ; and it is in light of this fact that the power to compel Barenblatt's
 testimony is sustained.
 The dissenting opinion, as to the constitutional issue, rests pri-
 marily on the absolute terms of the First Amendment, which provides
 that "Congress shall make no law" abridging freedom of speech, press,
 or assembly. The opinion asserts that the inquiries of the Un-American
 Activities Committee, including this one, "do precisely that" by exposing
 witnesses to obloquy and public scorn, thus penalizing them for their
 exercising of freedoms supposedly protected by the First Amendment.
 3 Certain prior decisions dealing with particular problems in this area are
 reviewed in Carr's, "Academic Freedom, the American Association of University
 Professors, and the United States Supreme Court," Spring, 1959 AAUP Bulletin,
 at p. 5.
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 The opinion is an eloquent assertion of the importance of freedom of
 political discussion and association, and of the danger of permitting
 even small inroads into this freedom, because of the demonstrated
 likelihood of their expansion into major ones. The opinion protests
 against the Court's application of a balancing process - weighing na-
 tional security claims against the claims of free speech and association -
 in order to determine the validity of an abridgement of expression and
 association. It asserts, however, that even if that method of reasoning
 is to be applied, the Court's use of it "completely leaves out the real
 interest in Barenblatt's silence, the interest of the people as a whole in
 being able to join organizations, advocate causes, and make political
 'mistakes' without later being subjected to governmental penalties for
 having dared to think for themselves."
 In justifying the balancing process for deciding the case, the ma-
 jority opinion quotes a sentence from the Association's amicus brief,
 which recognizes that "the claims of academic freedom cannot be
 asserted unqualifiedly" and must be weighed against other social interests
 in determining the validity of governmental action affecting those claims.
 "Academic freedom" as used in the brief had reference to a complex of
 acts and relationships. The opinion points out that the inquiry in
 the Barenblatt case did not extend to the content of academic instruc-
 tion, as did the questioning in the earlier Sweezy case.4 If it had, a
 decision that the inquiry was barred would almost certainly have re-
 sulted. The opinion recognizes the importance of academic freedom
 in the constitutional scheme in the following passage :
 Of course, broadly viewed, inquiries cannot be made into the teaching
 that is pursued in any of our educational institutions. When academic
 teaching-freedom and its corollary learning-freedom, so essential to
 the well-being of the Nation, are claimed, this Court will always be on
 the alert against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally pro-
 tected domain. But this does not mean that the Congress is precluded
 from interrogating a witness merely because he is a teacher. An edu-
 cational institution is not a constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into
 matters that may otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain
 merely for the reason that inquiry is made of someone within its walls.
 If First Amendment issues are to be decided by a process of
 balancing broad social interests, there is still both opportunity and need
 for definite propositions relating to the immunity of specific, narrowly
 defined freedoms from particular kinds of legislative invasion. The
 opinion of the Court, in the passage just quoted, enunciates such a
 proposition in relation to inquiries into the content of instruction.
 4 In that case, the constitutional issue relating to the First Amendment was
 discussed but not decided. See the article by Carr, cited in the preceding footnote.
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 Others might be stated, and may come to be adopted by the Court, with
 relation to constitutional protection of the individual from criminal
 punishment or legally imposed loss of employment on account of beliefs,
 utterances, or association involving the expression of views of any
 kind, including views which favor political revolution. Certainly within
 academic institutions and the academic profession, the absoluteness of
 freedom of belief, utterance, and association for the expression of
 belief must be unflinchingly maintained, and governmental efforts to
 invade it must be resisted.
 The Court in the Barenblatt case, following previous official con-
 clusions and prevailing opinion, accepts the view that the Communist
 Party's purposes, pursued secretly to some extent, include illegal action
 as distinguished from discussion, argument, and political action. In-
 vestigation into the extent of association with it can therefore be
 made, except where the individual interests at stake, or abuses in the
 investigative process such as the Court said were absent here, weigh
 more heavily in the balancing process than the governmental interest
 sought to be served. Here, the balance was struck in favor of the
 latter.
 The determination of this last question is the principal inadequacy
 of the Barenblatt decision from the standpoint of the academic profession.
 The opinion does not deal expressly with the aspects of higher educa-
 tion to which the Association's brief pointed as factors needing to be
 estimated. "One of the essential preconditions of academic freedom,"
 the brief asserted, "is unhampered control by the university over em-
 ployment of its faculty/' which should extend to the training of "candi-
 dates and novitiates," such as graduate students. The brief recited
 AAUP experience and developments set forth in recent literature,
 embracing denial or termination of academic employment as a result
 of the Barenblatt type of inquiry.5 It also pointed to the tendency of
 investigations such as those of the Un-American Activities Committee
 to lead students in particular "to prefer a posture of safety to the
 exercise of their freedoms." In the light of these factors, such investi-
 gations into Communism in higher education would better have been
 stopped by a constitutional barrier than allowed to continue, and the
 "academic autonomy," for which the brief argued, have been permitted
 free scope to supply needed safeguards against subversion in the colleges.
 At the very least, recognition might have been given to the need for
 considering the repressive effects upon higher education of inquiries
 such as that in this case, before coming to a decision.
 5 No assertion has been made that there was such a result in the Barenblatt
 case itself.
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 In NAACP v. Alabama? decided a year earlier, the Court cast
 the balance in favor of organizational freedom against official scrutiny
 into membership, because of the adverse consequences which disclosure
 of the names of Negro members of a hated organization would have
 produced in Alabama. Although these consequences were more obvious
 and dramatic than the partial paralysis of independent thought and
 expression which now prevails in some academic circles, they were not
 more insidious or harmful.
 It does not follow from the unconvincing nature of the reasoning
 of the majority of the Court that the dissenters who took an absolute
 position against any inquiry into "political" association are self-evidently
 correct. Wide-ranging legislative investigations have produced much
 good in this country, and restraints upon them must be kept to a
 minimum. It is certainly not clear that political association, carried
 on in secret, can be so definitely separated from indicated illegal activity
 of the same organizations as to permit immunizing it altogether
 from legislative investigations. The coercive effect upon individuals
 of Congressional investigations into Communism, which Mr. Justice
 Black's opinion amply demonstrates, results from an inflamed state of
 public opinion as well as from the disclosures themselves. Although
 the investigations have been deliberately designed to stimulate this
 state of opinion and to produce maximum effect, counter-efforts in
 behalf of justice to individuals can be carried on in the area of public
 opinion, to which legislators are directly responsible. Hence the absence
 of a rigid rule against investigations of this type need not spell the end
 of basic constitutional freedoms.
 In the counter-efforts that should be made, as well as in future
 constitutional litigation, other recent important judicial holdings can
 be put to use. These are to the effect that (1) legal action adverse to
 the individual cannot be based solely on past membership in the Com-
 munist Party, without reference to personal involvement in illegal
 activity;7 (2) refusal to take a broad oath disclaiming membership,
 including innocent membership, in organizations which advocate over-
 throw of the government by force or illegal means cannot be in itself
 a ground of exclusion from office;8 (3) a state investigation involving
 compulsory disclosure, which is likely to result in coercion against law-
 ful association, is unconstitutional ;9 and (4) the exercise of compulsion
 •357 U. S. 449 (1958).
 7 Schware v. State Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U. S. 232 (1957).
 *Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952); see also Speiser v. Randall,
 357 U.S. 512 (1958).
 9 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).
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 field by a clear showing of relevance of the inquiry to a valid legislative
 purpose.10
 Repressive measures of many varieties affecting academic freedom
 remain in effect on both the state and the national level. Many of
 these are far more serious than any Congressional investigations now
 being conducted. Among them are the various disclaimer oath laws,
 the laws which require faculty members to disclose their organizational
 affiliations as a condition of holding their official positions, and the
 laws which render it criminal to belong to organizations that "advocate"
 or even "believe in" the overthrow of the government by violence or
 illegal means. Not only are these measures ordinarily vague and
 uncertain in their operation, but they are symbolic of a wider legislative
 purpose to repress unorthodox views and associations, especially in
 the field of education. Efforts to combat these measures should be
 continued and intensified, lest the policy of enforcing conformity become
 permanent.
 By and large, the academic profession can be far more vigorous in
 relation to these matters than in general it has been. The result in the
 Barenblatt case can be a call to more effective action, rather than a
 ground of discouragement. The current widespread effort to secure
 the repeal of the oath provision of the National Defense Education Act,
 with the discernibly favorable effect of that effort on public opinion, is
 a heartening indication of what can be done.
 10 Watkins v. United States, 354 U. S. 178 (1957) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
 354 U. S. 234 (1957). Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72, decided the same day as
 Barenblatt v. United States, does much to weaken the force of prior holdings on
 this point and the previous one, however, and goes far to justify the anticipation of
 Mr. Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion in Barenblatt, that the holding there
 could easily lead to widespread extensions. The compulsion to disclose in the
 Uphaus case, which the Court upheld, involved the names of numerous people whose
 possible connections with the Communist Party had not been indicated in a broad
 investigation of "subversion" embracing a variety of organizations and individuals.
 Mr. Justice Brennan's careful dissent in Uphaus reveals tellingly how far the
 majority of the Court actually went. The Court seems in reality to be developing in
 this area a familiar pattern of inconsistent lines of decisions, either of which can
 be drawn upon in the future.
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